Practical Software Supply Chain Security

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
Family stats:

2 kids 4 cats 1 wife



Current State of Software Supply Chain Security


Software Supply Chain



Source: https://github.com/cncf/tag-security/blob/main/supply-chain-security/supply-chain-security-paper/CNCF_SSCP_v1.pdf


Supply chain attacks are becoming more common

FIGURE 1.7. NEXT GENERATION SOFTWARE SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACKS (2019-2023)



Source: https://www.sonatype.com/state-of-the-software-supply-chain/open-source-supply-and-demand

Threats all over the place



Source: <u>https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.0/threats-overview</u>

Threats #2

Integrity threat	Known example	How SLSA can help	D	Use compr
Submit unauthorized change (to source repo)	SushiSwap: Contractor with repository access pushed a malicious commit redirecting cryptocurrency to themself.	Two-person review could have caught the unauthorized change.		depen A-H, re
Compromise source repo	PHP: Attacker compromised PHP's self-hosted git server	A better-protected source code platform would have	F	Comp
	and injected two malicious commits.	been a much harder target for the attackers.	-	build p
Build from modified source	Webmin: Attacker modified the build infrastructure to use	A SLSA-compliant build server would have produced		
(not matching source repo)	source files not matching source control.	provenance identifying the actual sources used, allowing consumers to detect such tampering.	F	Upload packag match proces
	Submit unauthorized change (to source repo) Compromise source repo Build from modified source (not matching	Submit unauthorized change (to source repo)SushiSwap: Contractor with repository access pushed a malicious commit redirecting cryptocurrency to themself.Compromise source repoPHP: Attacker compromised PHP's self-hosted git server and injected two malicious commits.Build from modified source (not matchingWebmin: Attacker modified the build infrastructure to use source files not matching	Submit unauthorized change (to source repo)SushiSwap: Contractor with repository access pushed a malicious commit redirecting cryptocurrency to themself.Two-person review could have caught the unauthorized change.Compromise source repoPHP: Attacker compromised PHP's self-hosted git server and injected two malicious commits.A better-protected source code platform would have been a much harder target for the attackers.Build from modified source (not matching source repo)Webmin: Attacker modified the build infrastructure to use source control.A SLSA-compliant build server would have produced provenance identifying the actual sources used, allowing consumers to detect such	Integrity threatKnown examplenow ocon cannetpSubmit unauthorized change (to source repo)SushiSwap: Contractor with repository access pushed a malicious commit redirecting cryptocurrency to themself.Two-person review could have caught the unauthorized change.Compromise source repoPHP: Attacker compromised PHP's self-hosted git server and injected two malicious commits.A better-protected source code platform would have been a much harder target for the attackers.EBuild from modified source (not matching source repo)Webmin: Attacker modified the build infrastructure to use source control.A SLSA-compliant build server would have produced provenance identifying the actual sources used, allowing consumers to detect suchF

	D	Use compromised dependency (i.e. A-H, recursively)	event-stream: Attacker added an innocuous dependency and then later updated the dependency to add malicious behavior. The update did not match the code submitted to GitHub (i.e. attack F).	Applying SLSA recursively to all dependencies would have prevented this particular vector, because the provenance would have indicated that it either wasn't built from a proper builder or that the source did not come from GitHub.
	E	Compromise build process	SolarWinds: Attacker compromised the build platform and installed an implant that injected malicious behavior during each build.	Higher SLSA levels require stronger security controls for the build platform, making it more difficult to compromise and gain persistence.
	F	Upload modified package (not matching build process)	CodeCov: Attacker used leaked credentials to upload a malicious artifact to a GCS bucket, from which users download directly.	Provenance of the artifact in the GCS bucket would have shown that the artifact was not built in the expected manner from the expected source repo.

. . .

Source: <u>https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.0/threats-overview</u>

Software Bill of Materials

SBOM can help us understand what goes into an artifact

What's an SBOM?

[mike@linukka ~]\$ syft ✓ Loaded image ✓ Parsed image		
Cataloged packages	[66	packages]
NAME	VERSION	TYPE
alpine-baselayout	3.4.3-r1	apk
alpine-baselayout-data	3.4.3-r1	apk
alpine-keys	2.4-r1	apk
aom-libs	3.6.1-r0	apk
apk-tools	2.14.0-r2	apk
brotli-libs	1.0.9-r14	apk
busybox	1.36.1-r2	apk
busybox-binsh	1.36.1-r2	apk
ca-certificates	20230506-r0	apk

{
- "spdxVersion": "SPDX-2.3",
"dataLicense": "CC0-1.0",
"SPDXID":- "SPDXRef-DOCUMENT",
"name":-"go.mod",
"documentNamespace": "https://anchore.com/syft/file/go.mod-f518a5fa-36fc-4f90-996d-ec1a9e3b7c14",
"creationInfo": {
"licenseListVersion":-"3.21",
·····"creators": [
"Organization: Anchore, Inc",
"Tool: syft-0.86.1"
"created": "2023-11-20T12:39:12Z"
- S"packages" : / [
"name": "ariga.io/atlas",
"SPDXID": "SPDXRef-Package-go-module-ariga.io-atlas-4ba436b91a46da78",
versionInfo": //v0.9.1-0.20230119145809-92243f7c55cb",
"filesAnalyzed": false,
"sourceInfo": "acquired package info from go module information: /go.mod",
<pre>>>>>"licenseConcluded": -"NOASSERTION",</pre>
"licenseDeclared": -"NOASSERTION",
<pre>>>>"copyrightText": "NOASSERTION",</pre>
<pre>viewiewiewiewiewiewiewiewiewiewiewiewiewi</pre>
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
<pre>>>>referenceType": "purl",</pre>
•••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••

 Indexed file system Cataloged packages [29 packages] 	ackages]	
NAME	VERSION	TYPE
ariga.io/atlas	v0.9.1-0.20230119145809-92243f7c55cb	go-module
entgo.io/ent	v0.11.8	go-module
github.com/agext/levenshtein	v1.2.1	go-module
<pre>github.com/apparentlymart/go-textseg/v13</pre>	v13.0.0	go-module
github.com/davecgh/go-spew	v1.1.1	go-module
github.com/go-chi/chi/v5	v5.0.8	go-module
github.com/go-chi/httplog	v0.2.5	go-module


Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts

SLSA is a framework for software supply chain security SLSA is not just about providing this metadata, it's also

about treating your build system as a production system

SLSA helps to trace an artifact back to it's source

SLSA v1.0 - Build Track



Source: https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.0/threats-overview

SLSA Security Levels (for Build track)

Track/Level	Requirements	Focus
Build LO	(none)	(n/a)
Build L1	Provenance showing how the package was built	Mistakes, documentation
Build L2	Signed provenance, generated by a hosted build platform	Tampering after the build
Build L3	Hardened build platform	Tampering during the build

SLSA Provenance


Provenance according to Google search:

the place of origin or earliest known history of something

SLSA provenance (according to SLSA.dev):

verifiable information about software artifacts describing where, when and how something was produced

SLSA Provenance



Source: <u>https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.0/provenance</u>

	"builder": {
	<pre>"id": "https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/.github/workflows</pre>
	},
	"buildType": "https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/container@v1
	"invocation": {
	<pre>"configSource": {</pre>
	<pre>"uri": "git+https://github.com/verifa/verinotes@refs/tags/v0.2.0",</pre>
	····"digest": {
10	"sha1": "d0a495e16d32c2bb125bf1481f747e711714199b"
11	·····},
12	<pre>"entryPoint": ".github/workflows/release.yaml"</pre>
13	
14	<pre>"parameters": {},</pre>
15	"environment": {
	"github_ref": "refs/tags/v0.2.0",
17	•••••"github_ref_type":•"tag",
18	"github_repository_id": "603037671",
19	"github_repository_owner": "verifa",
20	"github_sha1": "d0a495e16d32c2bb125bf1481f747e711714199b"
21	
22	- }r
	"materials": [
25	"uri": "git+ <u>https://github.com/verifa/verinotes@refs/tags/v0.2.0</u> ",
	"digest": {
27	"sha1": "d0a495e16d32c2bb125bf1481f747e711714199b"
28	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
29	
30	
31	}

How many here generate SBOMs?

How many here generate SLSA provenance?

Source: <u>https://www.sonatype.com/state-of-the-software-supply-chain/software-supply-chain-maturity</u>

75%

of leaders reported generating SBOMs for their applications

25%

of engineering professionals reported generating SBOMs for their applications



Sigstore

The Sigstore framework and tooling empowers software developers and consumers to securely sign and verify software artifacts

The project is backed by the Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) under the Linux Foundation




Main components:

- cosign CLI
- Rekor transparency log
- **Fulcio** code signing Certificate Authority.

Let's build!

Pipeline Overview



Inside the Registry

registry tags for image: VI.O.1 sha256: sha256: https://www.sig

Pipeline - Build and Push

2	name: Release workflow
	on:
	push:
	tags:
	- n*n
	env:
	<pre>K0_D0CKER_REP0: "ghcr.io/\${{ github.repository}}"</pre>
	jobs:
	build:
	runs-on: ubuntu-latest
	permissions:
	contents: read
	packages: write
	outputs:
	<pre>image: \${{ steps.build.outputs.image }}</pre>
	<pre>digest: \${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}</pre>
	steps:
	– name: checkout repo
	uses: actions/setup-go@fac708d6674e30b6ba41289acaab6d4b75aa0753 #v4.0.1
	– uses: ko-build/setup-ko@ace48d793556083a76f1e3e6068850c1f4a369aa #v0.6
	– name: Build and push with ko
	id: build
	run:
	# Build & push the image. Save the image name & digest
	image_and_digest=\$(ko buildtags="\${tag}"baresbom=none .)
	# Output the image name and digest so we can generate provenance.
	digest=\$(echo "\${image_and_digest}" cut -d'@' -f2)
	<pre># digest/hash and image to outputs</pre>
	echo "digest=\$digest" >> "\$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
	echo "image=\$K0_DOCKER_REPO" >> "\$GITHUB_OUTPUT"

Pipeline - Sign Image

38	sign-image:
39	runs-on: ubuntu-latest
40	needs: [build]
	permissions:
42	packages: write
43	id-token: write
44	env:
45	<pre>image: \${{ needs.build.outputs.image }}</pre>
46	<pre>digest: \${{ needs.build.outputs.digest }}</pre>
	steps:
48	- name: Install cosign
49	- name: Login to ghcr.io
50	
	- name: Sign image
52	run:
53	<pre>cosign sign "\${image}@\${digest}"yes</pre>

Pipeline - Attach SBOM

55	sbom:
56	runs-on: ubuntu-latest
57	needs: [build]
58	permissions:
59	packages: write
60	id-token: write
61	env:
62	<pre>image: \${{ needs.build.outputs.image }}</pre>
63	<pre>digest: \${{ needs.build.outputs.digest }}</pre>
64	steps:
65	– name: checkout repo
66	- name: Install cosign
67	- name: Install Syft
68	- name: Login to ghcr.io
69	
70	- name: Attach SBOM to image
71	run:
72	# syft pulls the image and analyses the contents to generate an SBOM
73	syft "\${image}@\${digest}"output spdx-jsonfile sbom.spdx.json
74	cosign attestpredicate sbom-final.spdx.jsontype spdxjson "\${image}@\${digest}"yes

Pipeline - Generate & Attach SLSA Provenance

76	# slsa-github-generator creates and pushes the provenance attestation
77	provenance:
78	needs: [build]
79	permissions:
80 81 82 83	actions: read
81	id-token: write
82	# contents: read
83	packages: write
84	<pre>if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') # just to be safe, don't push if it's not a tag</pre>
85	<pre>uses: slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/.github/workflows/generator_container_slsa3.yml@v1.9.0</pre>
86	with:
87	<pre>image: \${{ needs.build.outputs.image }}</pre>
88	<pre>digest: \${{ needs.build.outputs.digest }}</pre>
89	<pre>registry-username: \${{ github.actor }}</pre>
90	compile-generator: true
91	secrets:
92	<pre>registry-password: \${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}</pre>


Open-source vs Private

Achieving SLSA (even Level 3) is fairly easy today for open-source projects, if you use the public sigstore instance and GitHub.

For private/proprietary projects, it's hard as you have to setup a code signing infrastructure. (also, how will consumers access it for verification?)

Signing

Sigstore



Source: https://www.sigstore.dev/how-it-works

Verifications

- Image Signature
- SBOM
- SLSA Provenance

Verifying

Verifying the Image with Nerdctl / Finch

finch run -it \setminus

--verify=cosign \

--cosign-certificate-identity=https://github.com/chainguard-images/images/.github/workflows/release.yaml@refs/heads/main \
--cosign-certificate-oidc-issuer=https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \

cgr.dev/chainguard/busybox /bin/sh

Verifying and downloading the SBOM (+grype)

cosign verify-attestation ghcr.io/verifa/verinotes:v0.2.0 \

---certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github.com/verifa/verinotes/.github/workflows/.*.yaml@refs/tags/v0.*.*' \

--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \

---type spdxjson | jg '.payload | @base64d' -r | jg '.predicate' | grype -v [0000] INFO grype version: 0.64.1 [0000] INFO new version of grype is available: 0.73.3 (currently running: 0.64.1) [0000] INFO downloading new vulnerability DB Verification for ghcr.io/verifa/verinotes:v0.2.0 --The following checks were performed on each of these signatures: - The cosign claims were validated - Existence of the claims in the transparency log was verified offline - The code-signing certificate was verified using trusted certificate authority certificates Certificate subject: https://github.com/verifa/verinotes/.github/workflows/release.yaml@refs/tags/v0.2.0 Certificate issuer URL: https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com GitHub Workflow Trigger: push GitHub Workflow SHA: d0a495e16d32c2bb125bf1481f747e711714199b GitHub Workflow Name: Release workflow GitHub Workflow Repository: verifa/verinotes GitHub Workflow Ref: refs/tags/v0.2.0 [0001] WARN some package(s) are missing CPEs. This may result in missing vulnerabilities. You may autogenerate these using: --add-cpes-if-none [0010] INFO updated vulnerability DB from version=5 built="2023-08-16 01:26:37 +0000 UTC" to version=5 built="2023-11-21 01:29:05 +0000 UTC" [0010] INFO found 9 vulnerabilities for 300 packages NAME INSTALLED FIXED-IN TYPE VULNERABILITY SEVERITY @svelteis/kit 1.6.0 1.15.1 npm GHSA-5p75-vc5a-8rv2 High @sveltejs/kit 1.6.0 1.15.2 GHSA-qv7q-x59x-wf8f npm High 8.4.21 8.4.31 GHSA-7fh5-64p2-3v2j Medium postcss npm 7.3.8 7.5.2 GHSA-c2qf-rxjj-qqgw Medium semver npm 5.18.0 5.19.1 GHSA-5r9g-gh6m-jxff Medium undici npm undici 5.18.0 5.19.1 GHSA-r6ch-mgf9-gc9w High npm undici 5.18.0 5.26.2 GHSA-wqq4-5wpv-mx2q Low npm vite 4.1.1 4.1.5 GHSA-353f-5xf4-aw67 High npm 1.2.4 GHSA-j8xg-fgg3-53r7 Medium word-wrap 1.2.3 npm

Verifying SLSA provenance

cosign verify-attestation \

--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

--certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/.github/workflows/generator_container_slsa3.yml

---policy policy.cue \

ghcr.io/verifa/verinotes:v0.2.0 | jq '.payload | @base64d' -r | jq '.predicate'

```
File: policy.cue
// The predicateType field must match this string
predicateType: "https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2"
predicate: {
  // This condition verifies that the builder is the builder we
  // expect and trust. The following condition can be used
  // unmodified. It verifies that the builder is the container
  // workflow.
  builder: {
    id: =~"^https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/.github/workflows/gener
  3
  invocation: {
    configSource: {
      // This condition verifies the entrypoint of the workflow.
      // Replace with the relative path to your workflow in your
      // repository.
      entryPoint: ".github/workflows/release.yaml"
      // This condition verifies that the image was generated from
      // the source repository we expect. Replace this with your
      // repository.
      uri: =~"^git\\+https://github.com/verifa/verinotes@refs/tags/v[0-9]+.[0-9]+.[0-9]+$"
    }
```

```
cosign verify-attestation \
  ---type slsaprovenance \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
  --certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/.github/workflows/generator_container_slsa3.yml@refs
  --policy policy.cue \
  ghcr.io/verifa/verinotes:v0.2.0 | jg '.payload | @base64d' -r | jg '.predicate'
will be validating against CUE policies: [policy.cue]
Verification for ghcr.io/verifa/verinotes:v0.2.0 --
The following checks were performed on each of these signatures:
  - The cosign claims were validated
  - Existence of the claims in the transparency log was verified offline
  - The code-signing certificate was verified using trusted certificate authority certificates
Certificate subject: https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/.github/workflows/generator_container_slsa3.yml@refs/tags/v1.9.0
Certificate issuer URL: https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
GitHub Workflow Trigger: push
GitHub Workflow SHA: d0a495e16d32c2bb125bf1481f747e711714199b
GitHub Workflow Name: Release workflow
GitHub Workflow Repository: verifa/verinotes
GitHub Workflow Ref: refs/tags/v0.2.0
  "builder"
    "id": "https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/.github/workflows/generator_container_slsa3.yml@refs/tags/v1.9.0"
  },
  "buildType": "https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/container@v1".
  "invocation":
    "configSource": {
     "uri": "git+https://github.com/verifa/verinotes@refs/tags/v0.2.0",
     "digest":
        "sha1": "d0a495e16d32c2bb125bf1481f747e711714199b"
      },
      "entryPoint": ".github/workflows/release.yaml"
    },
    'parameters': {},
    "environment": [
      "github_actor": "mvainio-verifa",
```

There is also an official slsa-verifier

Kyverno / Policy Controller

Isn't there an easier way?


GOOD NEWS!

Platforms and open-source ecosystems are coming up with native integrations

GitHub

🕑 Actions 🗄 Projects 🖽 Wiki 🕕 Security 10 🖂 Insights 🕸 Settings

Dependency graph




npm

Provenance



I created this metadata, now what?




Know your software supply chain

GUAC gives you directed, actionable insights into the security of your software supply chain.

Proactive

How do I prevent large scale supply chain compromises?



Preventive

Have I taken the right safeguards?

When deciding to use and deploy software, are there sufficient security checks and approvals?




Reactive

HOW AM I AFFECTED???

A vulnerability or supply chain compromise is discovered!





Further reading

What is in-toto and how it relates to SLSA? https://slsa.dev/blog/2023/05/in-toto-and-slsa

OpenPubKey vs sigstore (note: by sigstore maintainer):

https://blog.sigstore.dev/openpubkey-and-sigstore/

OpenVEX (& VEX in general): https://github.com/openvex

Homebrew core going for SLSA Build level 2: <u>https://blog.trailofbits.com/2023/11/06/adding-build</u>-provenance-to-homebrew/

CRI-O support for verifying image signatures: https://kubernetes.io/blog/2023/06/29/container-im age-signature-verification/

OpenSSF blog/github etc. https://openssf.org/blog/